Game theoretic models in fleet performance-based maintenance contracts

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Game theoretic models in fleet performance-based maintenance contracts

Abstract:
A fleet performance-based maintenance service contract (PB-MSC)is a service offered by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or an external service agent (service provider)to a company that owns a dump truck fleet to support its business processes. The trucks are sold with two-dimensional warranty; preventive maintenance is a part of the warranty package. We study a PB-MSC which provides some incentives to the OEM or the agent if the performance (i.e., availability) of a fleet goes beyond the target.Two options of PB-MSC offered to theowner. The decision problems for the OEM (or agent) and the owner are formulated using the Stackelberg game theory, in which the OEM or agent acts as a leader and the owner acts as a follower. The pricing structure and the number of servers for the optimal strategy for the agent and the optimal option for the owner are obtained.

Statement of Responsibility

Author(s)

H. Husniah - Personal Name
Bermawi P. Iskandar - Personal Name
Andriana - Personal Name

Edition

Call Number

658 HEN g

Subject(s)

two-dimensional warranty
fleet maintenance contract
non-cooperative games
expected profit maximisation

Classification

600

Series Title

GMD

Text

Language

English

Publisher

Publishing Year

2020

Publishing Place

Specific Detail Info

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APA Citation

H. Husniah. (2020).Game theoretic models in fleet performance-based maintenance contracts.(Electronic Thesis or Dissertation). Retrieved from https://localhost/etd